City of Fort Smith data breach expposed over 100,000 Sociall Security numbers , FSPD investigative reports



A detailed forensic investigation into the August 2026 cyberattack on the City of Fort Smith, Arkansas, has revealed that threat actors maintained unauthorized access to municipal networks for nearly a month before launching a file encryption operation, during which they exfiltrated approximately 5.7 terabytes of data including sensitive law enforcement materials.
The City first detected the incident on August 16, 2026, and engaged PNG Cyber through counsel Mullen Coughlin LLC to preserve and analyze evidence. The investigation, based on forensic images of three devices, Trend Vision One endpoint detection logs, and triage data from 872 systems, determined that the attackers were active from July 24 through August 18, 2026.
The intrusion began on July 24 at 15:46 UTC when a local user on the endpoint UTL-CAR-D8054 executed a malicious command in a Windows Run prompt after interacting with a ClickFix social engineering lure that presented a fake technical error or verification prompt.
The command contacted an external URL, downloaded a malware loader, and by 16:33 had created a Java-based remote access Trojan on disk. Roughly 20 minutes later the attackers used the Trojan to open a remote PowerShell session and move laterally to the server FSAR-ITS-SP01. Trend Micro later detected an infected file named ChromeUpdate.log in a user AppData directory on the initial host and cleaned it, with no further detections recorded on that system.
By the following morning ,the attackers had compromised a Windows user profile and used Remote Desktop Protocol from the host IT-WEB01 to log into the domain controller FSAR-ITS-DC02. While there they created the directory C:\Perflog, staged a reconnaissance script named Logon.ps1, and remotely executed it against nine network hosts. On July 26 they returned to the same domain controller and ran Advanced IP Scanner.
Two days later the Logon.ps1 script was executed on 42 hosts across the Fort Smith Police Department network. On July 31 a compromised profile opened a remote PowerShell session on FSPD-RM-230-5, ran the recon script, and approximately two hours later installed the ScreenConnect remote access tool. On August 3 the attackers executed recon scripts on 90 endpoints and ran the original remote access Trojan on the additional host ITS-CAR-D7169-N.
Data theft occurred primarily through the Azure Copy utility. On August 5 a compromised profile remotely logged into the CAD-SQL server, traversed folders on the network share \fspd-fs02, and staged azcopy.exe. Between 10:57 and 12:11 that day the tool was executed; Windows event logs recorded an error referencing an in-progress copy to the Azure blob storage address fsar34d.blob.core.windows.net.
On August 8 the same profile reconnected to CAD-SQL and used Azure Copy to transfer the contents of the E:\Database and H:\Database folders to a second blob address,
Pd12.blob.core.windows.net. Compromised profiles then logged into the host FSPD-FL-TAPE on August 14 and again on August 15, accessed multiple drives and shares, and executed Azure Copy on both occasions, though no forensic artifacts on that system identified the precise destination of those transfers.
The City later confirmed that the E:\Database and H:\Database directories contained sensitive law enforcement information, including investigative materials and evidence related to multiple criminal matters intended for restricted access. The threat actors provided PNG Cyber with three listings claiming possession of roughly 5,720 gigabytes of data comprising 4,882,956 files inside 326,671 folders; the City reviewed the listings and confirmed the material would have been reachable from CAD-SQL and FSPD-FL-TAPE. PNG verified evidence of exfiltration but did not independently examine the contents of the stolen data.
Public claims by the Interlock ransomware group matched these volumes and described the haul as including more than 100,000 Social Security numbers, police reports with photographs, phone data dumps, water supply system information, and a complete database of 911 calls and incidents.
On August 16 the attackers began a file encryption campaign, deploying an encryptor identified as win64.exe across the networks through a combination of Group Policy Object remote file deployment and direct targeting from the host KEL-IT-DC01. After the encryption payload executed, the actors changed passwords for dozens of domain user accounts.
The City subsequently clarified that the initial foothold occurred on the broader municipal network rather than originating inside Fort Smith Police Department systems, after which the attackers spread into police and other city systems.
As part of the response the City, with PNG’s assistance, deployed a managed detection and response solution. Deployment began on August 15 and proceeded incrementally over nine weeks, ultimately covering 872 endpoints. PNG monitored for unauthorized activity and used the sensors to collect additional forensic triage.
Two full triage collections were performed on each in-scope system, capturing event logs, registry data, program execution artifacts, scheduled tasks, network state, and browser artifacts. As of August 18 no active threat detections indicated ongoing compromise related to the incident, and PNG identified no residual malicious artifacts, persistent unauthorized access, or active command-and-control connections after remediation. The staggered sensor rollout, however, meant that some potential evidence was unavailable during earlier stages of the investigation.
The City has stated that certain files were accessed and downloaded without permission between August 5 and August 15 and that the affected information may include names, Social Security numbers, driver’s license or state identification numbers, financial account details, usernames and passwords, medical and health insurance information, biometric data, and records related to past or present police reports or other law enforcement matters.
Officials reported the incident to state and federal partners, including federal law enforcement, and have offered credit monitoring and identity restoration assistance to employees while directing the public to a toll-free assistance line and encouraging vigilance against identity theft.
The forensic findings indicate the known threat actors have not returned to the network since the encryption event and subsequent password resets.



